SonicWALL 5.8.1 Manuale Utente

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SonicOS 5.8.1 Administrator Guide
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Null Probe Response - When a wireless client sends out a probe request, the attacker 
sends back a response with a Null SSID. This response causes many popular wireless 
cards and devices to stop responding.
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Broadcasting De-Authentication - This DoS variation sends a flood of spoofed de-
authentication frames to wireless clients, forcing them to constantly de-authenticate and 
subsequently re-authenticate with an access point.
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Valid Station with Invalid (B)SSID - In this attack, a rouge access point attempts to 
broadcast a trusted station ID (ESSID). Although the BSSID is often invalid, the station can 
still appear to clients as though it is a trusted access point. The goal of this attack is often 
to gain authentication information from a trusted client. 
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Wellenreiter/NetStumbler Detection - Wellenreiter and NetStumbler are two popular 
software applications used by attackers to retrieve information from surrounding wireless 
networks.
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Ad-Hoc Station Detection - Ad-Hoc stations are nodes which provide access to wireless 
clients by acting as a bridge between the actual access point and the user. Wireless users 
are often tricked into connecting to an Ad-Hoc station instead of the actual access point, as 
they may have the same SSID. This allows the Ad-Hoc station to intercept any wireless 
traffic that connected clients send to or receive from the access point.
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Unassociated Station - Because a wireless station attempts to authenticate prior to 
associating with an access point, the unassociated station can create a DoS by sending a 
flood of authentication requests to the access point while still unassociated.
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EAPOL Packet Flood - Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL) packets are 
used in WPA and WPA2 authentication mechanisms. Since these packets, like other 
authentication request packets, are received openly by wireless access points, a flood of 
these packets can result in DoS to your wireless network.
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Weak WEP IV - WEP security mechanism uses your WEP key along with a randomly 
chosen 24-bit number known as an Initialization Vector (IV) to encrypt data. Network 
attackers often target this type of encryption because some of the random IV numbers are 
weaker than others, making it easier to decrypt your WEP key.
Practical RF Management Field Applications
This section provides an overview of practical uses for collected RF Management data in 
detecting Wi-Fi threat sources. Practical RF Management Field Applications are provided as 
general common-sense suggestions for using RF Management data. 
This section contains the following subsections:
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