Robert Bosch Pty Ltd VIMA01 Benutzerhandbuch
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
F005VP0801
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER
Page 20 of 49
Issue Number:
1.0
Dev No.
3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
DEV04205.9/I-1
5.2 Message Flow 1 - Normal Operation
Authentication Flow : After ignition or accessories is detected by the CU (EMS) the following steps will
normally be taken to validate the key. We have not added any new messages in the flow only
increased some message sizes.
normally be taken to validate the key. We have not added any new messages in the flow only
increased some message sizes.
1)
CU provides supply voltage to SMARTRA.
2)
CU sends command 06h – ACK.
3)
SMARTRA3 responds with 06h – ACK.
4)
CU sends command 4Bh - Transponder IDE (+ random number(6 bytes) ).
5)
SMARTRA3 responds with the transponder's Identifier (32 bits) [+ Return byte + encrypted number (6bytes) +State(1byte) ].
6)
CU sends command 52h – Read EEPROM Page.
7)
SMARTRA3 responds with 15h Negative Response. This indicates to EMS that Transponder is in learnt state.
8)
The CU generates a random number and calculates the encrypted lock password, then sends command 41h - Transponder
Authentication.
Authentication.
9)
SMARTRA3 responds with the encrypted key password.
10) The CU compares the encrypted key password from the transponder (via SMARTRA) with its calculated encrypted key password, if they
match then the key has been authenticated.
5.2.1.1 Message Sequence
Command
06h
53h
4Bh
41h
52h
57h
4Eh
54h
15h
Sequence
1 -
2
4 3 -
-
-
-
5.2.1.2 Message Flow Detail
Msg
Flow
no.
Flow
no.
T
P
P
S
M
M
EMS Mode
description
Description
EMS message
EMS message
Data EMS message
Description
Smartra Response
Smartra Response
Data Smartra Message
1
L L L
Normal
message Flow
All modules
learnt. Same
as Flow 9.
message Flow
All modules
learnt. Same
as Flow 9.
ACK request
IDE request
Read EEPROM
Authentication req
IDE request
Read EEPROM
Authentication req
0x49 0x02 0x06 0x08
0x49 S 0x4B RN1..6
0x49 S 0x52 PAGE
0x49 S 0x41 RN1..4
ELP1..4
0x49 S 0x4B RN1..6
0x49 S 0x52 PAGE
0x49 S 0x41 RN1..4
ELP1..4
ACK response
IDE Response
IDE Response
Negative response
Authentication Response
0x49 0x02 0x06 0x08
0x69 S R IDE1..4 + ERN1..6 + State byte
0x69 S R IDE1..4 + ERN1..6 + State byte
0x69 S 0x15 0xXX
0x69 S EKP1..4
5.2.2 Message Flow Diagram:
ACK request
IDE request
Authentication
T r ansp o nd er [ l ear nt ]
Smar t r a[ l ear nt ]
EM S[ l ear nt ]
EM S request s IDE from
transponder wit h 0x4B
+ ext ra bytes
transponder wit h 0x4B
+ ext ra bytes
Smart ra does t ransponder
encrypt ion
encrypt ion
Smartra sends
encrypt ed dat a
encrypt ed dat a
From IDE response EM S
knows t ype of Smartra, and
TP IDE.
knows t ype of Smartra, and
TP IDE.
Evaluate t ransponder
encrypt ed key password
if OK t hen st art engine
encrypt ed key password
if OK t hen st art engine
Smart ra knows t he EM S sw
is new version due t o ext ra
bytes - encrypt s RN1..4 and
passes to EM S
is new version due t o ext ra
bytes - encrypt s RN1..4 and
passes to EM S
0x69 S Ret IDE1..4 +
ERN1..6 + St ate byt e
ERN1..6 + St ate byt e
0x49 S 0x4B + RN1..6
0x69 S EKP1..4
0x49 S 0x41 RN1..4
ELP1..4
EM S request s ACK
0x49 0x02 0x06 0x08
EM S receives ACK
Smartra3 responds
wit h a ACK
Read EEPROM Page
Read EEPROM error
message received.
Request t he Transponder
Aut henticat ion
message received.
Request t he Transponder
Aut henticat ion
0x49 S 0x52 PAGE
0 x6 9 0 x15 er r o r
messag e
EM S request s t o read eeprom
page
page
0x69 0x02 0x06 0x08