Cisco Cisco IOS Software Release 12.4(4)T

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3. TOE Security Environment
  Document Organization
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Version 1.0
3. TOE Security Environment
To clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve, this section describes the 
following:
Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and of the manner for which the TOE 
is intended.
Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE or its 
environment is required.
Any organizational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must comply.
3.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
 lists assumptions that are made in relation to the operation of TOE. 
Table 7
Secure Usage Assumptions
Name
Description
A.PHYSEC
The TOE is physically secure.
A.MODEXP
The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable 
vulnerabilities is considered moderate.
A.GENPUR
There is no general purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the 
ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage 
repository capabilities on the TOE.
A.PUBLIC
The TOE does not host public data.
A.NOEVIL
Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all 
administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error.
A.SINGEN
Information cannot flow among the internal and external 
networks unless it passes through the TOE.
A.DIRECT
Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting 
the TOE may attempt to access the TOE from some direct 
connection (e.g., a console port) if the connection is part of the 
TOE.
A.REMACC
Authorized administrator may access the TOE remotely from 
the internal and external networks.
A.PROTECTIF
The PFSS is to be connected to the Cisco IOS Firewall enabled 
router such that the network interface of the PFSS is only 
accessible by the TSF. This may be achieved by either directly 
connecting the PFSS to the router, or indirectly over the trusted 
network. This protection of the PFSS network interface is 
required by PD-0113.